We consider a database X = (X1, · · · , Xn) containing the data of n users. The data aggregator wants to publicise the database, but wishes to sanitise the dataset to hide sensitive data Si correlated to Xi. This setting is considered in the Privacy Funnel, which uses mutual information as a leakage metric. The downsides to this approach are that mutual information does not give worst-case guarantees, and that finding optimal sanitisation protocols can be computationally prohibitive. We tackle these problems by using differential privacy metrics, and by considering local protocols which operate on one entry at a time. We show that under both the Local Differential Privacy and Local Information Privacy leakage metrics, one can efficiently obtain optimal protocols; however, Local Information Privacy is both more closely aligned to the privacy requirements of the Privacy Funnel scenario, and more efficiently computable. We also consider the scenario where each user has multiple attributes (i.e. Xi = (X 1 i , · · · , X m i )), for which we define Side-channel Resistant Local Information Privacy, and we give efficient methods to find protocols satisfying this criterion while still offering good utility. Exploratory experiments confirm the validity of these methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Let X be a finite set. Consider a database X = (X 1 , · · · , X n ) ∈ X n owned by a data aggregator, containing a data item X i ∈ X for each user i (For typical database settings, each user's data is a vector of attributes X i = (X 1 i , · · · , X m i ); we will consider this in more detail in Section V). This data may not be considered sensitive by itself, however, it might be correlated to a secret S i . The aggregator wants to release the database to the general public while preventing adversaries from retrieving the secret values S i . To do this, they release a privatised database Y = (Y 1 , · · · , Y n ), obtained from applying a sanitisation mechanism R to X. One way to formulate this is by considering the Privacy Funnel: Problem 1. (Privacy Funnel, [4] ) Suppose the joint probability distribution of S and X is known to the aggregator, and let M ∈ R ≥0 . Then find the privatization mechanism R such that I( X; Y ) is maximised while I( S; Y ) ≤ M .
There are two difficulties with this approach: 1) Finding and implementing good privatization mechanisms that operate on all of X can be computationally prohibitive for large n, as the complexity is exponential in n [6] , [14] . 2) Taking mutual information as a leakage measure has as a disadvantage that it gives guarantees about the leakage in the average case. However, if n is large, this still leaves room for the sanitisation protocol to leak undesirably much information about a few unlucky users.
To deal with these two difficulties, we make two changes to the general approach. First, we look at local data sanitisation, i.e. we consider optimization protocols Q : X → Y, for some finite set Y, and we apply Q to each X i individually; this situation is depicted in Figure 1 . These can be efficiently implemented. Second, to ensure strong privacy guarantees even in worst-case scenarios, we take stricter notions of privacy, based on Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [11] . The structure of this paper is as follows: 1) In Section II we define the mathematical setting of our problem. We discuss two privacy notions, LDP and Local Information Privacy (LIP), and discuss their relation to the Privacy Funnel. We argue that LIP is closer to the privacy requirements of the Privacy Funnel setting. 2) In Sections III and IV we show that for a given level of LDP or LIP, respectively, one can efficiently find the optimal sanitisation protocol. We show that finding the optimal LIP protocol can be done significantly faster than finding the optimal LDP protocol, especially for large X . 3) In Section V we consider the setting where every X i is a vector of attributes. We introduce a new privacy notion Side-channel Resistant LIP (SRLIP), which ensures that the sanitisation protocol does not leak unwanted amounts of information, even in the presence of side channels. We present an efficient method to find such protocols. 4) In Section VI, we numerically assess the methods presented in this paper. We compare the utility and computational complexity of LDP and LIP protocols in the single attribute setting, and LIP and SRLIP protocols in the multiple attributes setting.
II. MATHEMATICAL SETTING
The database X = (X 1 , · · · , X n ) consists out of a data item X i for each user i, each an element of a given finite set X . Furthermore, each user has sensitive data S i ∈ S, which is correlated with X i ; again we assume S to be finite (see Figure 1 ). We assume each (S i , X i ) is drawn independently from the same distribution p S,X on S × X which is known to the aggregator through observing ( S, X) (if one allows for non-independent X i , then differential privacy is no longer an adequate privacy metric [5] , [16] ). The aggregator, who has access to X, sanitises the database by applying a sanitisation protocol (i.e. a random function) Q : X → Y to each X i , outputting Y = (Y 1 , · · · , Y n ) = (Q(X 1 ), · · · , Q(X n )). The aggregator's goal is to find a Q that maximises the information about X i preserved in Y i (measured as I(X i ; Y i )) while leaking only minimal information about S i .
Without loss of generality we write X = {1, · · · , a} and Y = {1, · · · , b} for integers a, b. We omit the subscript i from X i , Y i , S i as no probabilities depend on it, and we write such probabilities as p x , p s , p x|s , etc, which form vectors p X , p S|x , etc, and matrices p X|S , etc. Furthermore, for two vectors v, w ∈ R n we write v w if v j ≤ w j for all j ≤ n.
As noted before, instead of looking at the mutual information I(S; Y ), we consider two different, related measures of sensitive information leakage. The first one is an adaptation of Local Differential Privacy (LDP), the de facto standard in information privacy [11] :
This is less strict than the 'standard' notion of ε-LDP, which measures the information about X leaked in Y . This reflects the fact that we are only interested in hiding sensitive data, rather than all data; it is a specific case of what has been named 'pufferfish privacy' [12] . The advantage of LDP compared to mutual information is that it gives privacy guarantees for the worst case, not just the average case. This is desirable in the database setting, as the aggregator wants to protect the private data of all users, not just of the average user. Another useful privacy metric is Local Information Privacy (LIP) [9] , [16] , also called Removal Local Differential Privacy [8] : 
Multiple attributes
Compared to LDP, the disadvantage of LIP is that it depends on the distribution of S; this is less relevant in our scenario, as the aggregator, who chooses Q, has access to the distribution of S. The advantage of LIP is that is more closely related to an attacker's capabilities: since P(Y =y|S=s)
, satisfying ε-LIP means that an attacker's posterior distribution of S given Y = y does not deviate from their prior distribution by more than a factor e ε . The following Lemma outlines the relations between LDP, LIP and mutual information (see Figure 2 ). Lemma 1. (See [16] ) Let Q be a sanitisation protocol, and let ε ∈ R ≥0 . 1) If Q satisfies ε-LDP, then it satisfies ε-LIP.
2) If Q satisfies ε-LIP, then it satisfies 2ε-LDP, and
Remark 1. One can choose to employ more stringent privacy metrics for LDP and LIP by demanding that Q satisfy ε-LIP (ε-LDP) for a set of p S,X , instead of only one [12] . Letting p S,X range over all possible distributions on S × D yields standard LIP (LDP) (i.e. w.r.t. X).
In this notation, instead of Problem 1 we consider the following problem:
Note that this problem does not depend on the number of users n, and as such this approach will find solutions that are scalable w.r.t. n.
III. OPTIMIZING Q FOR ε-LDP
Our goal is now to find the optimal Q, i.e. the protocol that maximises I(X; Y ) while satisfying ε-LDP, for a given ε. We can represent any sanitisation protocol as a matrix Q ∈ R b×a , where Q y|x = P(Y = y|X = x). Then Q defines a sanitisation protocol Q satisfying ε-LDP if and only if for all s, s ′ ∈ S we have ∀x :
As such, for a given Y, the set of ε-LDP-satisfying sanitisation protocols can be considered a closed, bounded, convex polytope Γ in R b×a . This fact allows us to efficiently find optimal protocols.
2) Let Γ be the polytope described above. Then one can find Q by maximising a convex function on Γ.
This result is obtained by generalising the results of [10] : there this is proven for regular ε-LDP (i.e. w.r.t. X), but the proof can straightforwardly be adapted to our situation. Together, these results reduce our problem to a finite optimisation problem: By point 1 we only need to consider Y = X , and by point 2 we only need to find the set of vertices of Γ, a a(a − 1)-dimensional convex polytope.
One might argue that since the optimal Q depends on p S,X , the publication of Q might provide an aggregator with information about the distribution of S. However, information on the distribution (as opposed to information of individual users' data) is not considered sensitive [13] . In fact, the reason why the aggregator sanitises the data is because an attacker is assumed to have knowledge about this correlation, and revealing too much information about X would cause the aggregator to use this information to infer information about S.
IV. OPTIMIZING Q FOR ε-LIP
If one uses ε-LIP as a privacy metric, one can find the optimal sanitisation protocol in a similar fashion. To do this, we again describe Q as a matrix, but this time a different one. Let q ∈ R b be the probability mass function of Y , and let R ∈ R a×b be given by R x|y = P(X = x|Y = y). Then a pair (R, q) defines a sanitisation protocol Q satisfying ε-LIP if and only if 0 q,
∀y :
∀y : e −ε p S p S|X R •|y e ε p S .
(In)equalities (8-10) can be expressed as saying that for every y ∈ Y one has that R •|y ∈ ∆, where ∆ is the convex closed bounded polytope in R X given by
As in Theorem 1, we can use this polytope to find optimal protocols:
2) Let ∆ be the polytope described above, and let V be its set of vertices. Then one can find Q by solving a #Vdimensional linear optimization problem. This is proven for ε = 0 (i.e. when S and Y are independent) in [15] , but the proof works similarly for ε > 0.
Since linear optimization problems can be solved fast, again the optimization problem reduces to finding the vertices of a polytope. The advantage of this approach, however, is that ∆ is a (a − 1)-dimensional polytope, while Γ is a(a − 1)dimensional. The time complexity of vertex enumeration is linear in the number of vertices [1] , while the number of vertices can grow superexponentially in the dimension of the polyhedron [2] . Together this means that we expect finding the optimum under LIP to be significantly faster than under LDP.
V. MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES
An often-occuring scenario is that a user's data consists out of multiple attributes, i.e. X i = (X 1 i , · · · , X m i ) ∈ X = m j=1 X j . This can be problematic for our approach for two reasons:
1) Such a large X can be problematic, since the computing time for optimisation both under LDP and LIP will depend heavily on a. 2) In practice, an attacker might sometimes utilise side channels to access to some subsets of attributes X j i for some users. For these users, a sanitisation protocol can leak more information (w.r.t. to the attacker's updated prior information) than its LIP-parameter would suggest. To solve the second problem, we introduce a more stringent privacy notion called Side-channel Resistant LIP (SRLIP), which ensures that no matter which attributes an attacker has access to, the protocol still satisfies ε-LIP with respect to the attacker's new prior distribution. For J ⊂ {1, · · · , m}, we write X J = j∈J X j and its elements as x J . Definition 3. (ε-SRLIP). Let ε > 0, and let X = m j=1 X j . We say that Q satisfies ε-SRLIP if for every y ∈ Y, for every s ∈ S, for every J ⊂ {1, · · · , m}, and for every x J ∈ X J one has
In the terms of Remark 1, Q satisfies ε-SRLIP if and only if it satisfies ε-LIP w.r.t. p S,X|x J for all J and x J . Taking J = ∅ gives us the regular definition of ε-LIP, proving the following Lemma:
While SRLIP is stricter than LIP itself, it has the advantage that even when an attacker has access to some data of a user, the sanitisation protocol still does not leak an unwanted amount of information beyond the knowledge the attacker has gained via the side channel. Another advantage is that, contrary to LIP itself, SRLIP satisfies an analogon of the concept of privacy budget [7] : Theorem 3. Let X = m j=1 X j , and for every j, let Q j : X j → Y j be a sanitisation protocol. Let ε j ∈ R ≥0 for every j. Suppose that for every j ≤ m, for every J ⊂ {1, · · · , j − 1, j + 1, · · · , m}, and every x J ∈ X J ,
The proof is presented in Appendix A. This theorem tells us that to find a ε-SRLIP protocol for X , it suffices to find a sanitisation protocol for each X j that is ε m -LIP w.r.t. a number of prior distributions. This can be done much faster than finding the optimal ε-LIP protocol for X , which can be seen as follows. By [1] , the time complexity of vertex enumeration is O(ndv), where n is the number of inequalities, d is the dimension, and v is the number of vertices. If we want to do the vertex enumeration needed for finding ε-LIP protocols for X , we see from (11) that we get d = a − 1 and n = a + 2c.
On the other hand, writing a j := #X j , we see that if we want to find the optimal sanitisation protocol for X j satisfying ε m -LIP w.r.t. each p S,X|X J =x J , we need to enumerate the vertices of a polytope ∆ j for every j, with n j dimensions, d j inequalities, and v j vertices. Similar to (11), we can describe ∆ j by
From this we see that we have d j = a j − 1 and n j = a j + 2c j ′ =j (a j ′ + 1). In total the time complexity of finding all Q j is O n j d j v j . While n j > n typically, since v can depend superexponentially on a, we expect v j ≪ v, and furthermore d j < d. Therefore we expect finding ε-SRLIP protocols via Theorem 3 to be substantially faster than finding ε-LIP protocols via Theorem 2. However, since ε-SRLIP is stricter than ε-LIP, and since Theorem 3 does not necesarily give the optimal ε-SRLIP protocol, we pay for it in utility. In Section VI, we investigate this experimentally.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We test the feasibility of the different methods and privacy definitions by performing small-scale experiments on synthetic data. All experiments are implemented in Matlab and conducted on a PC with Intel Core i7-7700HQ 2.8GHz and 32GB memory. We compare the computing time for finding optimal ε-LDP and ε-LIP protocols for c = 2 and a = 5 for 10 random p S,X , obtained by generating each p s,x uniformly from [0, 1] and then rescaling. We take ε ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}; the results are in Figure 3 . As one can see, Theorem 2 gives significantly faster results than Theorem 1; the average computing time for Theorem 1 for ε = 0.5 is 133s, while for Theorem 2 this is 0.0206s. With regards to the utility I(X; Y ), since ε-LDP implies ε-LIP, the optimal ε-LIP protocol will have better utility than the optimal ε-LDP protocol. However, as can be seen from the figure, the difference in utility is relatively low.
Note that for bigger ε, both the difference in computing time and the difference in I(X; Y ) between LDP and LIP become less. This is because of the probabilistic relation between S and X, for ε large enough, any sanitisation protocol satisfies ε-LIP and ε-LDP. This means that as ε grows, the resulting polytopes will have less defining inequalities, hence they will have less vertices. This results in lower computation times, which affects LDP more than LIP. At the same time, the fact that every protocol is both ε-LIP and ε-LDP will result in the same optimal utility.
In Figure 4 , we compare optimal ε 2 -LDP protocols to optimal ε-LIP protocols. Again, LIP is significantly faster than LDP. Since ε-LIP implies ε 2 -LDP, the optimal ε 2 -LDP has higher utility; again the difference is low.
We also perform similar comparisons for multiple attributes, for c = 3, a 1 = a 2 = 8, comparing the methods of Theorems 2 and 3. This time we take 30 samples for each value of ε. The results are presented in Figure 5 . As one can see, for small ε Theorem 3 is significantly faster, being on average 72.5 times as fast as Theorem 2 for ε = 0.5; the difference in utility is more pronounced, however, compared to the LDP-vs-LIP situation. This is caused on one hand by the fact that ε-SRLIP is a stricter privacy requirement than ε-LIP, and on the other hand by the fact that Theorem 3 does not give us the optimal ε-SRLIP protocol.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Local data sanitisation protocols have the advantage of being scalable for large numbers of users. Furthermore, the advantage of using differential privacy-like privacy metrics is that they provide worst-case guarantees, ensuring that the privacy of every user is sufficiently protected. For both ε-LDP and ε-LIP we have found methods to find optimal sanitisation protocols. Within this setting, we have found that ε-LIP has two main advantages over ε-LDP. First, it fits better within the privacy funnel setting, where the distribution p S,X is (at least approximately) known to the estimator. Second, finding the optimal protocol is significantly faster than under LDP, especially for small ε. If one nevertheless prefers ε-LDP as a privacy metric, then it is still worthwile to find the optimal ε 2 -LIP protocol, as this can be found significantly faster, at a low utility cost. In the multiple attributes setting, we have shown that ε-SRLIP is a more sensible privacy metric than ε-LIP, since in the presence of side channels it does not leak undesirably more information about sensitive data beyond what the attacker knows via the side channels. Furthermore we can find ε-SRLIP protocols in a fraction of the time it takes to find ε-LIP protocols, while still offering reasonable utility. Compared with the stronger privacy guarantees, this makes for a compelling reason to prefer ε-SRLIP over ε-LIP (and hence ε-LDP) as a privacy metric in the multiple attributes setting.
For further research, two important avenues remain to be explored. First, the aggregator's knowledge about p S,X may not be perfect, because they may learn about p S,X through observing ( S, X). Incorporating this uncertainty leads to robust optimisation [3] , which would give stronger privacy guarantees. Second, it might be possible to improve the method of obtaining ε-SRLIP protocols via Theorem 3. Examining its proof shows that lower values of ε j may suffice to still ensure ε-SRLIP. Furthermore, the optimal choice of (ε j ) j≤m such that j ε j = ε might not be ε j = ε m . However, it is computationally prohibitive to perform the vertex enumeration for many different choices of (ε j ) j≤m , and as such a new theoretical approach is needed to determine the optimal (ε j ) j≤m from ε and p S,X .
